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ABSTRACT 
This paper uses a computable general equilibrium approach to simulate two opposing views describing 
regional trade agreements either as building blocks for or stumbling blocks to multilateral trade 
liberalization. This study focuses on the free trade agreement (FTA) between the Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and the European Union (EU). Results show that although a 
regional trade agreement may slightly raise welfare among the members of the agreement, the cost to 
nonmembers can be high. In this paper we argue that multilateral liberalization and a regional free trade 
agreement between the EU and CEMAC are not mutually exclusive. Regional trade agreements should be 
complementary and consistent with a multilateral agreement, not an attempt to replace it. The regional 
breakdown in our design considers 14 regions, allowing for country-specific analysis for one least-
developed country (Democratic Republic of Congo) and one non-least-developed country (Cameroon). 
Multilateral liberalization amplifies welfare gain for Cameroon. The Democratic Republic of Congo, with 
its weaker institutional capacity, is affected negatively. An EU-CEMAC FTA without multilateralism 
produces gains for both Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The gain for Cameroon is, 
however, moderate compared with that achieved when the EU-CEMAC FTA is accompanied with a 
multilateral agreement.   
Keywords: Central Africa, EU, regional trade, multilateral trade, computable general equilibrium 
model 
 
JEL codes: F13, F53, C68 1 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
With the surge in regional trading arrangements (see Figure 1) in recent years, Central African countries 
are often confronted with the challenge of prioritizing their trade policies among competing demands on 
unilateral, regional, and multilateral fronts. In a static model, there are sound reasons for believing that a 
multilateral approach to trade liberalization is superior, at least in terms of maximizing welfare gain. This 
has been verified in Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996); Levy (1997); Bagwell and Staiger (2001); Krishna 
(1998); Bhagwati, Greenaway, and Panagariya (1998); and Panagariya (1999 and 2000). The principle of 
most favored nation (MFN) liberalization in the World Trade Organization (WTO) says that a country 
that grants trade concessions to one party of the agreement must grant the same concessions to all 
signatories of the agreement. Under conditions of perfect competition, this multilateral principle will 
always lead to a welfare gain (Lamy 2002; Fink and Jansen 2007). Regionalism, in contrast, is 
discriminatory. It applies the MFN principle only to countries within a given region. The exclusion of 
nonpartner countries from MFN status can lead to both trade diversion and trade creation and, thus, 
reduce welfare when trade diversion is greater than trade creation (Vinter 1950). Supporters of 
multilateralism argue that regional trade agreements produce limited benefits or even losses for their 
participants and are likely to undermine the multilateral trade system and, ultimately, slow global trade 
liberalization (Gupta and Yang. 2005). 







Proponents of regionalism, however, argue that the trade diversion effects due to regional trade 
agreements tend to be smaller than their trade creation effects. When removing the assumption of perfect 
competition, for instance, there might be positive benefits of scale effects from regional trade agreements 
(Delorme and van der Mensbrugghe 1990; Lamy 2002).
1 For a developing country, in particular, 
removing nontariff barriers under imperfect competition may have strong positive effects due to 
                                                      
1 There are, however, more meaningful positive benefits of scale effects only when reduction of tariffs in the trade 
agreement is accompanied with a substantial reduction of nontariff barriers.  2 
 
increasing returns to scale at the firm level and differentiated markets (Lamy 2002). In addition to 
achieving cost reduction as a result of increasing returns to scale, regional trade agreements may 
successfully erode the market power of dominant firms in the member countries by encouraging market 
entry of competing firms from other member countries and, thereby, contribute to lowering prices (Smith 
and Venables 1988). They may also increase opportunity for investment and growth. This would be the 
case when, for instance, by increasing market size, countries in the regional free trade agreement (FTA) 
increase their returns on capital and thereby the level of foreign direct investment (Lamy 2002; Gupta at 
al. 2005). Supporters of preferential agreements also argue that the multilateral system is cumbersome and 
that a growing number of preferential agreements could accelerate global trade liberalization. 
The effects of bilateral and/or preferential trade agreements on multilateral trade agreements have 
been considered in a number of studies. Since Bhagwati (1991) posed the issue of preferential agreements 
either encouraging or discouraging multilateralism, a number of studies have followed. Hadjiyiannis 
(2004) theoretically showed that the impact of regionalism on multilateral trade liberalization depends 
critically on which countries engage in regionalism. Limao (2006a) noted that recent empirical research 
suggested that the U.S. and European Union (EU) preferential agreements were a stumbling block to the 
Uruguay Round, and using data on U.S. multilateral tariffs, Limao (2006b) provided the first systematic 
evidence that preferential agreements hindered multilateralism. More recently, Karacaovali and Limao 
(2008) developed a model showing that preferential agreements hinder multilateralism unless they entail 
accession to a customs union with internal transfers. 
This paper uses the most recent Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database to simulate these 
two opposing views regarding regional preferential agreements: Are they building blocks for, or 
stumbling blocks to, multilateral trade liberalization? The focus of this study is the FTA between the 
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) and the EU. Using the GTAP model 
(Hertel 1997), we compare the impacts of a regional FTA between CEMAC and the EU when happening 
simultaneously with multilateral liberalization, with the impacts when happening without multilateral 
liberalization. We simulate the effects at the CEMAC regional level, but we also focus on one least-
developed country in the region (Democratic Republic of Congo) and one non-least-developed country 
(Cameroon). 
The following hypotheses are tested in this study: (1) Multilateral liberalization under the Doha 
Development Agenda and an FTA between the EU and Central African countries under an economic 
partnership agreement (EPA) are not mutually exclusive. (2) If preferential agreements are complemented 
with multilateral integration, the trade creation effects of the agreements would dominate the trade 
diversion effects. If, however, the preferential agreements are implemented in the absence of 
multilateralism, they could run the risk of leading to costly trade diversion and a decrease in welfare. (3) 
An FTA alone between the EU and Central African countries under an EPA is unlikely to substantially 
benefit Central African countries. 
In this paper we argue that multilateral liberalization and a regional FTA between the EU and 
CEMAC are not exclusive (see Bhagwati 1993; Baghwati and Panagariya 1996). Regional trade 
agreements should be complementary and consistent with a multilateral arrangement, not an attempt to 
replace it (United Nations 2004). A prodevelopment multilateral liberalization would amplify the benefits 
of an EU-CEMAC FTA as envisioned by the EPA. The most difficult issues in trade negotiation under 
the EPA, those related to agriculture for instance, could find solutions in a multilateral arrangement. 
Hence, it would be desirable for the FTA between the EU and CEMAC to happen simultaneously with 
multilateral liberalization (Hinkle and Schiff 2004). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes CEMAC and São Tomé 
and Príncipe within the regional economic communities in Central Africa. Section 3 examines the basic 
arrangements proposed by the EU-CEMAC FTA. In Section 4, the data and model used for the analyses 
are described. The policy experiments and results are reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 3 
 
2.  OVERVIEW OF CEMAC 
The CEMAC customs union was created in 1994 between Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, 
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. The original CEMAC was created to replace the 
Union Douanière des Etats d’Afrique Centrale with the objective of furthering regional integration and 
policy effectiveness. The 1994 reforms that created CEMAC introduced: (1) a common external tariff; (2) 
the gradual removal of tariffs on intraregional trade (completed in 1998); (3) the harmonization of indirect 
taxation (with the introduction of a Value added tax in 1999); and (4) the replacement of import barriers 
with temporary import surcharges (Tsangarides and Martijn 2007). The union was later joined by São 
Tomé and Príncipe and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) in 2004 and 2005, respectively. 
Economics statistics for CEMAC countries are reported in Table 1. CEMAC member states had a 
total estimated population of 98.9 million in 2007,
2 with an annual GDP of US$32.4 billon and an average 
growth rate of 4.3 percent.
3 Aside from Cameroon, Gabon, and Republic of Congo contributing to more 
than half of the region’s real GDP (2005 estimates), all other CEMAC members are classified as least-
developed countries, where more than half of the population lives below the poverty line (see Table 1).  
Table 1. Economic statistics for CEMAC member states (2005) 












Area (sq km)  475,440 1,284,000 622,984 342,000 28,051 267,667 1,001 2,345,410
GDP (US$million constant 2000)  12,057 2,600 918 3,987 2,203 5,375 56 5,236
GDP per capita ($ constant 2000)  739 267 227 997 4,387 3,884 357 91
Shares of GDP   
Agriculture  41.10 22.70 53.90 5.60 5.93 7.70 14.90 46.00
Industry  14.10 51.20 21.40 46.40 94.70 57.60 12.60 25.30
Manufacturing  7.20 4.70 9.40 5.50 1.60 4.50 3.00 5.50
Services  44.80 26.10 24.80 48.10 4.18 34.80 72.50 28.70
Population (in thousands)  16,322 9,749 4,038 3,999 5,040 1,384 1,570 57,549
Source:
:1Data are from the World Fact Book, CIA. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-orldfactbook/geos/cd.html 
2Development Data Group, The World Bank. 2007. 2007 World Development Indicators Online. Washington, DC: The World 
Bank. Available at: http://go.worldbank.org/3ju2ha60d0 
The production and trade structure in CEMAC is characterized by production and exports of 
natural resources and primary commodities. Over 50 percent of CEMAC’s exports are mineral fuels and 
extracted oils. Oil exports represent over 90 percent of exports in Chad, Republic of Congo, and 
Equatorial Guinea. Only the Central African Republic and São Tomé and Príncipe differ from this 
pattern, but their economies are heavily dependent on diamonds and wood, respectively (Table 2).  
Apart from oil and diamonds, agriculture is the only other sector generating substantial export 
revenues for the region. Cameroon relies on agriculture and timber for its export earnings, with cocoa and 
rubber production comprising the major subsectors of its economy. Timber is Gabon’s second largest 
                                                      
2 Calculated from data published by World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision. Available online at  
http://www.un.org/esa/population. 
3 Development Data Group, The World Bank. 2007. 2007 World Development Indicators Online. Available at: 
http://go.worldbank.org/3ju2ha60d0. 4 
 
export. Overall, agriculture is limited, and over 50 percent of the region’s food needs are satisfied by 
imports.  
Table 2. CEMAC key exports: oil and diamonds 
Country 
Oil exports as a share of total 
exports 
Diamond exports as a share of 
total exports 
Cameroon 49.60%  - 
Chad 93.31%  - 
Central African Republic  0.38%  50.83% 
Congo 90.26%  - 
Equatorial Guinea  94.20%  - 
Gabon 76.24%  - 
São Tomé and Príncipe  -  49.89%   
DR Congo  17.16%  45.00% 
Table 3 presents the major CEMAC exports for each member state. The region’s total 
merchandised exports were valued at approximately $23 billion in 2005. The United States, EU and 
China are the major import markets for the region, accounting for over 95 percent of total CEMAC 
exports. This is especially the case for crude oil products, which account for 64 percent of exports from 
Congo, 45 percent from Equatorial Guinea, 69 percent from Gabon, and more than 80 percent from Chad. 
EU imports from Central Africa are mostly agro-based merchandise. 
Table 3. CEMAC exports by country 
Country Exports 
Cameroon  Crude oil, petroleum products, timber, cocoa, aluminum, coffee, cotton 
Chad  Cotton, oil, livestock, textiles 
Central African Republic  Diamonds, timber, cotton, coffee, tobacco 
Congo  Oil, timber, plywood, sugar, cocoa, coffee, diamonds 
Equatorial Guinea  Petroleum, timber, cocoa 
Gabon  Crude oil, timber, manganese, uranium 
São Tomé and Príncipe  Cocoa 
DR Congo  Diamonds, copper, coffee, cobalt, crude oil 
Each of the eight members of CEMAC is a member of at least one other EPA in central Africa. 
All eight are also members of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) as well. The 
objectives of ECCAS are wide, covering peace promotion, political cooperation, and conflict prevention. 
CEMAC, instead, has more circumscribed objectives, aiming at the establishment of a common market; 
the free movement of goods, services, people, and capital; the establishment of a common currency; and 
the convergence of macroeconomic policies. The DR Congo stands out among CEMAC members by 
having memberships in two other groups: the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and 




3.  TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN CEMAC  
Trade in the CEMAC region is hampered and distorted due to the low complementarities of natural 
endowments, cumbersome and costly border procedures, and the region’s small markets. Other obstacles 
are a poor transportation infrastructure, security problems, administrative capacity constraints, as well as 
national restrictions and exemptions in defiance of the common rules that members have agreed on 
(Tsangarides and Martijn 2007). 
The creation of CEMAC and the observed increase in the number of regional free trade 
agreements in Africa raise the issue of the effectiveness of these agreements in establishing common 
markets, integrating African economies, and alleviating poverty. Under perfect competition, the effects of 
regional trade agreements such as CEMAC are ambiguous. A country in a regional trade agreement is 
expected to benefit from importing commodities that were once highly protected in domestic markets, but 
will suffer losses from switching imports away from a low-cost third country nonparty to the agreement 
(Gupta and Yang 2005). Indeed, if tariffs on the same goods are eliminated between countries A and B, 
but not between A and C, then exports from B become relatively inexpensive when compared with those 
of C. If imported goods are more competitive overall, consumers in countries A and B will tend to switch 
away from domestically produced goods, implying trade creation. On the other hand, countries A and B 
will decrease imports from C because of the tariffs, resulting in trade diversion (Lamy 2002). The net 
effect on economic welfare is therefore ambiguous and will depend on other factors such as the level of 
tariffs imposed on countries outside the region. Compared with other regional unions in sub-Saharan 
Africa, the common external tariffs implemented by CEMAC member states have been relatively high 
(e.g., 19 percent vs. 12 percent for the West African Economic and Monetary Union [WAEMU]). The 
breakdown of import tariff, for instance, indicates that rates of 23 percent or more, on average, are put on 
footwear, wood products, and agricultural produce that can also be produced domestically.
4 CEMAC 
tariffs are also more dispersed than those of the WAEMU, which further complicates customs 
administration and creates price distortions across imported goods (Tsangarides and Martijn 2007). 
Although external tariffs remain an important source of fiscal revenue for CEMAC countries, 
trade liberalization could have a positive impact on economic growth and poverty reduction (Romalis 
2006; Berg and Krueger 2003). Trade liberalization could also foster development, diversifying exports 
away from oil and diamonds (Tsangarides and Martijn 2007). Although tariff reductions could be 
effective in boosting development, measures to compensate for lost tariff revenues may also be needed.  
In December 2000, CEMAC ministers mandated the preparation of trade negotiations with the 
EU under the EPA structure. In August 2002, the consul created a regional committee to conclude these 
negotiations with the purpose of creating a free trade area between CEMAC and the EU in conformity 
with the WTO rules. Detailed overviews of the EPAs between the EU and sub-Saharan Africa are in 
Meyn (2008) and in Curran, Nilsson, and Brew (2008). 
A regional FTA between CEMAC and the EU, as envisioned under the EPA, has the potential to 
solve some of the problems that could not be solved within the CEMAC region. An EPA could be helpful 
in strengthening administrative capacity in CEMAC states and thereby make it possible to enforce the 
application of trade rules by all CEMAC countries. Particularly concerning rules of origin, an EPA could 
give the CEMAC region new breath in empowering the regional authorities and help them to harmonize 
rules and procedures and to reform the investment climate (South Center 2007; Tsangarides and Martijn 
2007). 
Additionally, an FTA could enlarge and diversify markets for CEMAC countries in both 
agricultural and nonagricultural products. In the manufacturing sector, for instance, by opening markets to 
the EU, CEMAC countries could attract industries that use inputs from elsewhere but benefit from local 
and inexpensive labor in Central Africa. CEMAC could also benefit from an EPA in the service sector, 
                                                      
4 See table A.3. 6 
 
but more so from the import side, due to the less-developed nature of the export service sector in CEMAC 
(Hinkle and Schiff 2004). 
In agriculture and food security, where CEMAC has been pursuing harmonization of agricultural 
policies within a broader framework related to improving integration of the regional market, the region 
could also benefit from an EPA with the EU. Since 1999, CEMAC has singled out a number of goals that 
would increase agricultural productivity and improve food security in the region. These goals include 
increasing producer income; increasing the productivity of agriculture in the region; developing an 
infrastructure to overcome high transportation costs within the region and improve competitiveness; 
increasing the amount allocated to agricultural finance in national budgets; and promoting the 
diversification and rural development of the agricultural sector, particularly in CEMAC oil-exporting 
countries affected by Dutch disease. To achieve these goals, CEMAC could benefit from an FTA with the 
EU to secure market access through quotas and low or zero tariffs; it could also lead to greater price 
stability in some important agricultural markets in the region including bananas, sugar, beef, and veal. 
CEMAC countries could also have access to sectors that in the past have been highly protected by the EU 
Common Agriculture Policy (South Center 2007). 
Although an EPA between EU and CEMAC would provide Central African countries with 
opportunities to enlarge their market, strengthen institutional capacity, and raise policy credibility, it is 
still discretionary and therefore may still create trade diversion. Imports from non-EU sources by 
CEMAC countries represent 47 percent of their total imports, and nearly all these imports can also be 
supplied by the EU. Hence, if there is an EPA between EU and CEMAC, then there are risks that 
CEMAC countries would increase their imports from the EU in place of lower-priced products currently 
imported from other sources. 
Moreover, as in the case of the reduction of external tariffs, an EPA between EU and CEMAC 
could lead to substantial losses of fiscal revenue for Central African countries. The eventual revenue 
losses of an EPA would be significant, because more than 50 percent of CEMAC imports are from the 
EU. This issue could be addressed, however, by the EPA development agreement, where African 
countries are proposed to open up their markets to the EU after a prior identification of sensitive products 
in the region, both agricultural and industrial, and to have the flexibilities provided for in the WTO for an 
asymmetrical and gradual opening of markets. 
 7 
 
4.  MODEL AND DATA 
The model used in this study is the standard GTAP comparative static model, largely documented in 
Hertel and Tsigas (1997).
5 The standard GTAP model is a multiregion, multisector, computable general 
equilibrium model that uses an algebraic framework resulting from imposing the conditions of producer 
and consumer maximization on the accounting framework of the social accounting matrix. The algebraic 
framework is used to analyze the behavior of numerous economic agents including producers, 
households, and governments.    
The standard GTAP assumption is perfect competition and constant returns to scale where 
bilateral trade is handled via the Armington framework (products are differentiated by country of origin).
6 
The model assumes that there is a regional household that collects all income and allocates across private 
consumption, government, and saving. Household demand for commodities and services are in constant 
difference elasticity form, which assumes nonhomothetic preferences and is more flexible than the 
constant elasticity of substitution form. Producers are assumed to have a constant elasticity of substitution 
production function (Hertel and Tsigas 1997). 
We used the standard GTAP model with a few adjustments in the closure rules to accommodate 
different scenarios used in the simulations. As in McDonald and Walmsley (2003), we include three 
fundamental adjustments to the standard GTAP closure. First, we adopt a fixed trade balance to account 
for the fact that developing and underdeveloped countries follow a managed float regime. Their trade 
balances are fixed, while savings change. Second, we considered a more realistic assumption for countries 
in CEMAC that there is not full employment of unskilled workers. In African countries there is 
commonly an excess supply of unskilled labor that can be used by industries in case there is an increase in 
production. To account for this fact, wage rates are assumed exogenous (fixed) and labor supply is 
assumed endogenous. Lastly, we account for fixed prices in the market for the dominant exports such as 
oil and diamonds. The price of diamond exports from the DR Congo, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Central 
African Republic is in general fixed by the Central Selling Organization. Crude oil in the region is 
produced by Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Although these countries are not 
members of OPEC, their crude oil prices are to a large extent dictated by OPEC.    
To analyze the impact of the FTA between the EU and CEMAC, we used the standard GTAP 
model with 14 region/country aggregations. Details of the regional breakdown are given in Table A.1 in 
the appendix. The sector breakdown consisted of 15 sectors that were aggregated from the 57-sector 
GTAP database (see Table A.2). The regional and commodity aggregations reflected the known patterns 
of trade and various trade agreements in Central Africa (McDonald and Walmsley 2003). For country-
specific analysis, the DR Congo and Cameroon are analyzed separately from CEMAC.
7 The choice of 
these individual countries was mainly dictated by the GTAP data set, in which only these two CEMAC 
countries are separate regions. Oil and minerals are analyzed separate from other commodities.   
 
                                                      
5 The GTAP static model used here does not allow fully capturing the dynamic gains of an FTA between CEMAC and EU. 
To have a full picture of the benefits for such a trading arrangement, a dynamic computable general equilibrium model should be 
used. We leave that for future work.  
6 The standard GTAP model used in this paper does not include both imperfect competition and  
   increasing return to scale. This caveat could be addressed in future work.  
7 GTAP project has recently increased efforts in disaggregating the African region in its database.   Input-Output (I-O) tables 
for all of the newly added African countries were constructed in-house by mapping them to the regions for which GTAP has 
contributed I-O data, based on per-capita GDP match. For DR Congo and Cameroon, however, I-O tables were contributed by 
African economists and were then compare to those available on the database, based on per-capita GDP match.   
 8 
 
5.  SIMULATION RESULTS 
5.1. The FTA with Multilateral Liberalization 
The welfare effects of the EU-CEMAC FTA given multilateral liberalization are given in Tables 4 and 5. 
The results show an increase in welfare for all regions except the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) area, WAEMU, and the DR Congo, where losses are 0.01, 0.76, and 0.12 percent of GDP, 
respectively. North Africa, the rest of the world (ROW), and Cameroon show the largest welfare gain 
with 4.1, 1.64, and 1.53 percent of GDP, respectively. The EU has a relatively moderate gain of 0.11 
percent of GDP.  
Table 4. Regional welfare impacts: FTA with multilateral trade agreement 
Region  GDP (Millions of Dollars)  Millions of Dollars  Percent of GDP 
NAFTA 11,418,072.00  -1,013.53  -0.01 
EU_25 8,297,006.00  9,184.84  0.11 
North Africa  247,714.06  10,099.96  4.08 
WAEMU 26,158.81  -199.65  -0.76 
Rest of ECOWAS
1  52,919.15 522.96  0.99 
DR Congo  5,184.30  -6.48  -0.12 
Cameroon 8,641.54  131.86  1.53 
Rest CEMAC  11,524.80  12.16  0.11 
COMESA 49,843.16  7.45  0.01 
SADC 138,444.09  2,207.46  1.59 
Latin America  1,383,859.25  5,145.79  0.37 
Rest of Europe  1,092,938.00  5,403.50  0.49 
COMESADC 33,418.48  406.54  1.22 
Rest of World  8,686,665.00  142,059.88  1.64 
Note:
 1 Economic Community of West African States 
Table 5. Decomposition of welfare changes 
Region  Allocative 
Efficiency  Endowment  Term of 
Trade 
Investment 
Saving  Total Welfare 
NAFTA  3,570.17  -3,292.73 -566.92 -724.05  -1,013.53 
EU_25 5,774.44  -791.98  4,037.01  165.37  9,184.84 
North Africa  7,834.68  3,906.10  -1,546.40  -94.43  10,099.96 
WAEMU  131.06  55.02 -216.25 -169.48 -199.65 
Rest of ECOWAS  983.63  21.46  -294.24  -187.89  522.96 
DR  Congo  0.78 -3.79 -6.57  3.09 -6.48 
Cameroon 51.87  89.01  -17.57  8.54  131.86 
Rest of CEMAC  32.91  -5.79  -91.18  76.22  12.16 
COMESA  365.27  342.63 -366.35 -334.10  7.45 
SADC  931.28 944.56 164.03 167.59  2,207.46 
Latin America  4,091.21  0.00  1,366.32  -311.74  5,145.79 
Rest of Europe  6,341.51  0.00  -1,488.00  549.98  5,403.49 
COMESADC  165.99  231.87 7.95 0.73  406.55 
Rest of World  68,320.93  73,870.64  -981.83  850.16  142,059.89 
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The relatively good performance of North Africa, ROW, and Cameroon is attributable to their 
gains in both allocative efficiency and endowments. All of them, however, recorded deterioration in their 
terms of trade. The effects on capital goods were positive for both ROW (US$850 million) and Cameroon 
(US$8.5 million) but negative for North Africa (−US$94.43 million). The moderate gain for the EU is 
explained by gains in allocative efficiency and in capital goods, as well as an improvement in the terms of 
trade. These gains were counterbalanced by a reduction in employment of unskilled labor. The DR Congo 
recorded positive impacts on allocation efficiency, but the overall welfare was hindered by a reduction in 
employment of unskilled labor and a deterioration of the terms of trade (see Table 5). 
Table 6 presents exports and imports under the FTA/multilateralism scenario. In DR Congo, 
exports increased for the oil, other fuels, manufactures (light), utilities, construction, public 
administration, and other services sectors. In contrast, agricultural exports decreased, as did food 
products, textiles, manufactures, heavy manufactures, and machinery. The most significant export change 
for DR Congo was a 28 percent increase in other fuels exports and a 27 percent decrease in textile 
exports. The decrease in textile exports is due to this sector’s being heavily protected and internationally 
noncompetitive. The DR Congo imports, on the other hand, decreased in most sectors, particularly in 
construction (14 percent), light manufactures (8 percent), and animals (5 percent). Textile imports 
increased by 2.6 percent.  
Table 6. Impact of the FTA with multilateral liberalization on exports and imports 
      Exports        Imports    
Sector DR  Congo  Cameroon  Rest of 
CEMAC  DR Congo  Cameroon  Rest of 
CEMAC 
Crops -12.29  18.08  -10.65  -4.01  1.65  -1.96 
Animals -4.04  -1.99  20.54  -5.91  1.38  -7.86 
Oil 0.47  0.00  0.00  -2.74  44.21  -9.80 
Minerals 0.00  -4.35  0.00  -2.04  7.38  6.51 
Other  fuels  28.72 13.96  26.12  -0.83 23.51 6.23 
Food products  -19.55  -18.84  8.63  0.16  17.03  12.54 
Textiles   -27.05  -5.38  15.46  2.61  27.82  4.92 
Heavy manufactures  -2.15  12.82  22.69  -1.38  9.84  5.46 
Manufacture -8.15  3.66  27.99  -1.79  10.95  10.03 
Light  manufactures    2.68 7.36  19.47  -8.06 4.69  5.22 
Machinery   -1.38  7.11  25.98  -4.42  10.72  4.56 
Utilities 2.63  4.98  16.07  -1.59  -3.64  -7.97 
Construction  0.53 8.61  12.96  -14.87 1.65  -4.00 
Public administration  0.51  4.12  11.80  -0.01  -2.12  -8.56 
Other services  3.03  7.02  11.59  -1.26  -2.50  -4.58 
Results for Cameroon were very different from the DR Congo. Unlike the DR Congo, both 
exports and imports increased for the majority of products in Cameroon. The most substantial increase in 
exports was in agricultural crops, other fuels, and heavy manufactures. Exports in these sectors increased 
18, 14, and 13 percent, respectively. Imports increased significantly for oil (44 percent), textiles (28 
percent), and other fuels (24 percent); however, Cameroon imports of utilities declined by 3.6 percent and 
public administration by 2.1 percent. 
The rest of CEMAC showed substantial increases in exports, with the most significant increase 
being in manufactures (27 percent), other fuels (26 percent), machinery (26 percent), heavy manufactures 
(23 percent), and animals (20 percent). Of all exports, only agricultural crops declined (11 percent). 
CEMAC imports declined in more than five sectors including crops, animals, oil, utilities, construction, 
and other services. The most significant decrease was in the other services sector (61 percent). 
Figure 2 shows the output for different sectors as affected by liberalization under the present 
scenario. In the DR Congo, output declined in most sectors, particularly in construction (13 percent) and 10 
 
light manufactures (6 percent). Cameroon, in contrast, showed a significant output increase in 
construction (6 percent), heavy manufactures (5 percent), and other fuels (4 percent). More than five 
sectors, however, showed decreases in output. This resulted in small increases in exports but significant 
increases in imports for Cameroon.   
Displaying a similar pattern to Cameroon, CEMAC showed significant output increases in the 
machinery (8 percent), other fuels (4 percent), utilities (4 percent), and construction (3 percent) sectors. 
Also similar to Cameroon, CEMAC outputs for more than five sectors declined. This resulted in 
significant increases in imports for CEMAC (DR Congo and Cameroon excluded).  
Figure 2. Changes in outputs by sector 
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5.2. The FTA without Multilateral Liberalization 
When the FTA between EU and CEMAC is implemented without multilateral liberalization, the results 
change in many ways. As opposed to the case where the FTA is accompanied by multilateral 
liberalization, all changes in welfare across regions are negative except for the regions in the agreement 
(see Table 7). The EU shows a gain of US$367 million, which is less than 1/100 percent of GDP. The 
welfare gain for the DR Congo was only 0.006 percent of GDP, and for Cameroon, the welfare gain was 
0.9 percent of GDP. The rest of CEMAC realized the highest relative gain (1.3 percent of CEMAC GDP). 
Although all the signatories to the agreements achieved welfare gains, the relative magnitude 
compared with those recorded in the case of multilateral liberalization varies among regions. The EU 
welfare gain was 0.004 percent as compared to 0.11 percent with multilateral liberalization. Similarly, the 
welfare gain for Cameroon was 1.5 percent with multilateral liberalization and only 0.9 percent without. 
The rest of CEMAC as well as the DR Congo gained more under the FTA without multilateral 
liberalization. For the DR Congo, the FTA with the multilateral liberalization was welfare decreasing; 
however, without multilateralism, the FTA was welfare increasing (Table 7).   11 
 
Table 7. Regional welfare impacts of the FTA (without multilateral liberalization) 
Region  GDP (Millions of Dollars)  Millions of Dollars  Percent of GDP 
NAFTA 11,417,747.00  -103.473  -0.001 
EU_25 8,292,233.00  366.880  0.004 
North Africa  235,970.47  -5.356  -0.002 
WAEMU 25,971.00  -6.526  -0.025 
Rest of ECOWAS  51,911.77  -5.370  -0.010 
DR Congo  5,187.46  0.320  0.006 
Cameroon 8,614.78  81.798  0.950 
Rest of CEMAC  11,628.68  150.245  1.292 
COMESA 49,131.84  -5.831  -0.012 
SADC 136,565.02  -8.721  -0.006 
Latin America  1,379,765.00  -16.524  -0.001 
Rest of Europe  1,086,596.75  -11.677  -0.001 
COMESADC 33,018.70  -3.964  -0.012 
Rest of World  8,544,498.00  -17.349  0.000 
The difference between the two scenarios for the EU is mostly explained by a positive but smaller 
gain in both allocative efficiency (US$116 million) and endowments (US$94 million), as well as a loss in 
capital goods (US$15 million). The smaller welfare gain for Cameroon is explained by a smaller gain in 
allocative efficiency, endowments, and capital goods. For the rest of CEMAC, allocative efficiency nearly 
doubled when the FTA was implemented without multilateral liberalization. Lastly, the DR Congo 
achieved higher gains in allocative efficiency, endowments, capital goods, and the terms of trade without 
multilateralism (Table 8).  
Table 8. Decomposition of welfare changes 
Region  Allocative 






NAFTA  -33.29  -14.28 -29.76 -26.14  -103.47 
EU_25 115.51  93.99  172.26  -14.88  366.88 
North  Africa  -0.67  -2.15 -2.13 -0.41  -5.36 
WAEMU  -1.34  -0.41 -3.66 -1.12  -6.53 
Rest of ECOWAS  -1.88  -0.40  -2.34  -0.74  -5.37 
DR  Congo  0.01  0.13 0.16 0.02  0.32 
Cameroon 44.94  69.19  -41.39  9.06  81.80 
Rest of CEMAC  70.08  60.92  -42.43  61.67  150.25 
COMESA  -1.35  -2.08 -1.77 -0.63  -5.83 
SADC -1.46  -1.77  -6.07  0.58  -8.72 
Latin America  -2.99  0.00  -10.98  -2.56  -16.52 
Rest of Europe  0.29  0.00  -8.54  -3.42  -11.68 
COMESADC  -0.57  -1.35 -2.00 -0.04  -3.96 
Rest  of  World  1.83  23.56 -21.37 -21.36  -17.35 
Changes in exports and imports in response to the FTA (without multilateral liberalization) vary 
with each sector; however, changes are significantly smaller for most sectors in this case (Table 9). In the 
DR Congo, the largest increase in exports was in the food products sector (1.4 percent). With 
multilateralism, exports in this sector declined by 20 percent. The textile sector is particularly better off 
under this scenario with a 0.06 percent increase compared to a 27 percent loss in the previous case. 
Although Congolese imports in most sectors increase, the changes are small in magnitude. The smaller 12 
 
changes, in both exports and imports, translate to almost no changes in the balance of payments (see 
Figure 3). When the FTA is implemented with multilateral liberalization, in contrast, the change in the 
balance of payments is very substantial. 
Table 9. Impact of the FTA without multilateral liberalization on exports and imports 
      Exports        Imports    
Sector  DR 
Congo  Cameroon   Rest of 
CEMAC+ 
DR 
Congo  Cameroon   Rest of 
CEMAC+ 
Crops -0.081  9.584  8.079  0.544  1.796  9.313 
Animals 0.023  9.083  10.250  0.019  0.051  2.814 
Oil -0.002  0.000  0.000  -0.011  -2.393  -7.549 
Minerals 0.000  3.584  0.000  0.004  0.437  3.872 
Other fuels  -0.031  11.408  17.438  0.014  23.082  8.642 
Food products  1.400  1.876  10.289  0.138  11.884  15.219 
Textiles 0.063  12.646  18.427  0.019  21.499  5.735 
Heavy manufactures  0.009  14.836  14.854  0.057  7.214  7.843 
Manufacture 0.017  11.706  18.735  0.191  9.977  14.050 
Light manufactures   0.024  18.717  17.192  0.050  4.599  8.342 
Machinery   0.039  14.416  24.461  0.042  10.588  7.932 
Utilities -0.083  10.136  9.726  -0.004  -5.348  -4.554 
Construction -0.005  11.430  9.824  0.084  2.355  1.514 
Public administration  -0.001  8.336  8.063  -0.007  -4.414  -6.191 
Other services  0.007  7.789  6.353  0.006  -4.017  -2.300 
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Changes in the balance of payments for Cameroon are significant in both scenarios. In both cases 
only crops and other services show increases in Cameroon. The increase in the crops sector is explained 
by increases in exports and moderate increases in imports. The changes in all other sectors are either close 
to zero or significantly negative (see Figure 4).  
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The rest of CEMAC follows the same pattern as Cameroon, with the exception that the change in 
balance of payments for crops is negative in the case of the FTA with multilateral liberalization, but 
improves in the case of an FTA without multilateral liberalization (see Figure 5). 
The small changes in the trade balance for the DR Congo is due to the insignificant changes in 
output in the no-multilateralism scenario. In Cameroon, in contrast, outputs changed significantly, and the 
magnitude and direction of trade depended on the sector. The most significant increases were in 
construction, heavy manufacture, and crops. The largest decrease was in machinery and light 
manufacture. In the rest of CEMAC, the largest output increases were in machinery (6 percent) and 
construction (6 percent; see Figure 4).  
Multilateral liberalization amplifies the welfare gain for Cameroon. The DR Congo, with its 
weaker institutional capacity, is affected negatively. An EU-CEMAC FTA without multilateralism 
produces gains for both Cameroon and the DR Congo. The gain for Cameroon is moderate when 
compared to that achieved when the EU-CEMAC FTA is accompanied with the multilateral agreement. 
The EU, with strong institutional capabilities to adjust larger market size, benefits more from the EU-
CEMAC FTA accompanied with multilateralism than from the EU-CEMAC FTA alone. The rest of 
CEMAC, within which all countries are least developed (except Gabon and Republic of Congo), benefits 
more from the EU-CEMAC FTA alone than from the EU-CEMAC FTA accompanied with 
multilateralism. Results show that the CEMAC region is actually better off without the multilateral 14 
 
agreement when there is a regional agreement with the EU. This suggests that CEMAC member states 
would have little interest in the success of multilateralism. This is also noted by Ponte, Raakjær, and 
Campling (2007), who suggest that given that African countries already have preferential access to the 
EU, they have little interest in seeing the current WTO negotiations succeed because increased market 
access for non-African countries could lead to the eroding of the current preferences they enjoy with the 
EU. 






















6.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we argue that a multilateral liberalization and a regional FTA between EU and CEMAC are 
not exclusive. A prodevelopment multilateral liberalization would amplify the benefits of an FTA 
between the EU and CEMAC as envisioned by the EPA. The most difficult issues in trade negotiations 
under the EPA, those related to agriculture for instance, could find solutions in a multilateral arrangement. 
Hence, it would be desirable that an FTA between the EU and CEMAC happen simultaneously with a 
multilateral liberalization. 
To support this argument, we compare the results of two policy simulations. First, we assume that 
the FTA between the EU and CEMAC happens simultaneously with multilateral liberalization; and 
second, using results of the first scenario as the point of reference, we simulate an FTA between EU and 
CEMAC without multilateral liberalization, and then compare results. 
Results show that all regions in the model are better off with multilateralism, except NAFTA, 
WAEMU, and the DR Congo. Cameroon received the largest welfare gain. The EU gained moderately. 
Assuming that there is no multilateral liberalization, results showed losses in welfare across all regions 
except for those regions belonging to the FTA. EU welfare increased by US$367 million, representing 
0.004 percent of GDP. DR Congo showed an increase in welfare of 0.006 percent of GDP, and Cameroon 
gained 0.9 percent. The rest of CEMAC realized the highest relative gain (1.3 percents of GDP). 
Although all members of the FTA achieved welfare gains, the relative magnitude compared with 
those recorded in the case of an FTA with multilateral liberalization varies with region. The EU shows 
welfare gains of 0.11 percent with multilateral liberalization. Cameroon shows welfare gains of 1.5 
percent of GDP with multilateral liberalization. The rest of CEMAC gain more with the FTA without 




Table A.1. Aggregation of regions 
Region in the Model   Regions in GTAP  Countries 
DR Congo   DR Congo   DR Congo  
Cameroon   Cameroon   Cameroon  
Rest of CEMAC+  Rest of CEMAC  Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé and Príncipe 
EU_25  European Union  European Union 
WAEMU   Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Rest of 
WAEMU  
Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, 
Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo  
Rest of ECOWAS  Rest of ECOWAS, Ghana  Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
Rest of Europe  Rest of Europe  Rest of Europe 
North Africa  Algeria, Egypt, Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, Morocco, Tunisia  
Algeria, Egypt, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Morocco, 
Tunisia  
NAFTA  North America  United States of America, Canada, Mexico 
Latin America  Latin America  Central America and the Caribbean, Colombia, 
Peru, Venezuela, Rest of Andean Pact, Rest of 
South America 
Rest of the World   Oceania, East Asia, SE Asia, 
South Asia, Middle East 
Australia, New Zealand, Chile, China, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, 
Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Rest of South Asia, 
Former Soviet Union, Turkey, Rest of Middle East, 
Rest of World 
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Table A.2. Aggregation of commodities 
Model Commodities  GTAP 5 Commodities 
Crop agriculture 
 
Paddy rice, wheat, cereal grains nec, vegetables, fruit, nuts, oil seeds, sugarcane, 
sugar beet, plant-based fibers, crops nec, fishing, forestry 




1  Minerals nec 
Other fuels and minerals  Coal, gas, petroleum, coal products 
Food products  Bovine cattle, sheep and goat, horse meat prods; meat products nec; dairy 
products; vegetable oils and fats; processed rice; sugar; food products nec; 
beverages and tobacco products 
Textiles  Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products 
Heavy  Wood products, paper products, publishing, chemical, rubber, plastic products 
Manufacturing  Mineral products nec, ferrous metals, metals nec, metal products 
Light  Motor vehicles and parts, transport equipment nec, electronic equipment 
Manufacturing  Machinery and equipment nec, manufactures nec 
Utilities  Electricity, gas manufacture, distribution, water 
Construction Construction 
Trade Trade 
Public administration  Pub admin./defense/ health/education 
Other services  Trade, transport nec, sea transport, air transport, communication, financial 
services nec, insurance, business services nec, recreation and other services, 
dwellings 
Note:
 1 nec =
 not elsewhere classified  
 
    18 
 
Table A.3. CEMAC and WAEMU most favored nation import tariff rates by sector 
Harmonized System Classification 









Animal and animal products  22.7  6.4  15.1  6.1 
Vegetable products  23.4  9.8  14.3  6.8 
Foodstuffs 25.3  9.1  16.5  5.6 
Mineral  products  10.1  2.2 6.1 3.4 
Chemicals and allied products  11.3  6.6  7.1  5 
Plastics/ Rubbers  16.5  9.4  10.7  6.2 
Raw, hides, skins, leather and fun  19.5  10  12  5.7 
Wood and wood products  26.3  8.1  10.6  6.3 
Textiles 22.1  8.6  17.1  5 
Footwear/Headgear   29.3  2.6  17.7  4.2 
Stone/Glass 24.9  9.3  15.3  6 
Metals 16.7  7.9  12.7  6.8 
Machinery  14.2  7.1 8.8 5.8 
Transportation 16.5  9.4  10.3  6.2 
Miscellaneous 21.3  9.4  14.4  6.6 
          
Unweighted average  19.1  9.6  12.1  6.8 
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